Précis for In Praise of Ambivalence
Ambivalence is a form of inner volitional conflict that we experience as being irresolvable without significant cost. Because of this, very few of us relish feelings of ambivalence. Nor do we find it easy to deal with. Yet for many in the Western philosophical tradition, ambivalence is not simply an unappealing experience that’s hard to manage. According to the Unificationists, ambivalence is a defect of the will. It is, in other words, an important way to fail to be a well-functioning agent. The reasons for this, we’re told, are threefold. First, ambivalence precludes agents from resolving their wills in a way that is necessary for autonomy. Second, ambivalence precludes agents from fully affirming their lives, and in particular from fully affirming the choices they make. As a result, it robs them of an important source of meaning. Finally, ambivalence causes agents to act in self-defeating ways. In so doing, they act without integrity. Ambivalence is thus seen as a threat to a suite of important agential goods, and as a result, it imperils the best forms of human agency. In Praise of Ambivalence carefully considers these three unificationist arguments in Part I. There, we see that ambivalence does not preclude volitional resolution or normatively significant forms of affirmation. Nor does it guarantee self-defeat. Consequently, ambivalence as such is no threat to autonomy, meaning, or integrity. In Part II, ambivalence is revealed to have an important role in securing the very goods that unificationists contend it undermines. The best forms of human agency are therefore shown to be not only compatible with ambivalence but as regularly requiring it. Ambivalence is thus not a volitional defect, but a crucial constituent of well-functioning agency.
Ambivalence is a form of inner volitional conflict that we experience as being irresolvable without significant cost. Because of this, very few of us relish feelings of ambivalence. Nor do we find it easy to deal with. Yet for many in the Western philosophical tradition, ambivalence is not simply an unappealing experience that’s hard to manage. According to the Unificationists, ambivalence is a defect of the will. It is, in other words, an important way to fail to be a well-functioning agent. The reasons for this, we’re told, are threefold. First, ambivalence precludes agents from resolving their wills in a way that is necessary for autonomy. Second, ambivalence precludes agents from fully affirming their lives, and in particular from fully affirming the choices they make. As a result, it robs them of an important source of meaning. Finally, ambivalence causes agents to act in self-defeating ways. In so doing, they act without integrity. Ambivalence is thus seen as a threat to a suite of important agential goods, and as a result, it imperils the best forms of human agency. In Praise of Ambivalence carefully considers these three unificationist arguments in Part I. There, we see that ambivalence does not preclude volitional resolution or normatively significant forms of affirmation. Nor does it guarantee self-defeat. Consequently, ambivalence as such is no threat to autonomy, meaning, or integrity. In Part II, ambivalence is revealed to have an important role in securing the very goods that unificationists contend it undermines. The best forms of human agency are therefore shown to be not only compatible with ambivalence but as regularly requiring it. Ambivalence is thus not a volitional defect, but a crucial constituent of well-functioning agency.